China advised not to snub arbitration


Opinio Juris

First Signs that China Is Taking the Philippines Arbitration Seriously?
Posted: 15 Feb 2013 10:35 PM PST
by Julian Ku

As far as I can tell, the Chinese government continues to pretend as if the Philippines’ Law of the Sea arbitration claim doesn’t exist. Articles like this one suggest the Philippines government continues to wait for some official or unofficial Chinese response. The February 22 deadline for China to appoint an arbitrator is fast approaching.

There are obviously bigger things going on in the world, and in East Asia (the North Korea nuclear tests come to mind). But it is worth noting that I ran across, for the first time, an article in the Chinese press discussing the arbitration with sophistication and a very good understanding of the Annex VII process. Published in the journal “瞭望新闻周刊“ or “Outlook Newsweekly”, the article describes the views of an unnamed expert advising the Chinese government not to take the Filipino arbitration claim lightly.

The expert offers a few considerations for the Chinese government. Among other things, the expert notes that the Philippines is using this arbitration to gain support and sympathy from its neighbors (Vietnam is supporting) and its allies (US Secretary of State Kerry and the EU Parliament head support it). The claim also hypes suspicions of China at the United Nations and elsewhere.

More interestingly, the expert further notes that if China does nothing, the arbitration will still continue with the Japanese ITLOS president appointing the rest of the members. (Maybe the expert was reading Opinio Juris!). In any event, the expert advises the Chinese government to appoint an arbitrator and work hard to convince to arbitration tribunal to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, China can at any time during the arbitration work out a settlement agreement with the Philippines. (There is more to the article, but this is the key advice).

So is this is a sign of where the Chinese government is going? It seems unlikely that the musings of an unnamed expert will be very important, but who knows? At the very least, it seems as if there is some thinking on this issue going on in China. The 30 day clock continues to tick. Only six days left!

Published in: on February 16, 2013 at 10:50 am  Comments (2)  
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Top ten issues for human rights in 2012


imagesHere’s my choice for the top ten most important developments for Human Rights in the Philippines for 2012:
1. Passage of the Anti-Enforced Disappearance Law. Unfortunately, the passage of this law was overshadowed by the passage of the Reproductive Health Law. I say unfortunate because unlike the RH Law which in jurisprudence says is a penumbra of the due process clause, the crime of “desperacidos”, which unlike violations of international humanitarian law is not considered a crime under customary public international law.

This means that a domestic law is actually required to make enforced disappearances criminal. Now that we have this law, victims of desperacidos can actually file criminal charges for enforced disappearances without relying on kidnapping, if their loved ones survive; or murder, if their loved ones are found dead.

2. Passage of the Reproductive Health Law. The passage of this law has made jurisprudence on the right to privacy unnecessary. Prior to passage of the law, women’s rights advocates relied on the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in arguing that failure of the state to provide family planning implements to those who cannot afford them is a form of discrimination.

They also relied on the US Supreme Court decision that states that the right to limit one’s family size is covered by the right to privacy and is a “penumbra” of the due process clause. With this domestic law in place, it has now become the business of government to ensure that its citizens can freely choose the size of their families.

3. Passage of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. This is in the list not because it promotes and protects human rights, but precisely because it will violate them. Unless declared unconstitutional, libel in cyberspace, which has already been pronounced as infringing on freedom of expression by the United Nations Human Rights Committee, will be even more severely punished under the new law. All future convicts will be guaranteed time in jail as the new penalties for cyber libel make them no longer eligible for parole.

Furthermore, the law’s so-called “take-down” provision, which enables the Justice secretary to unilaterally shut down Web sites, will enable the state to act as investigator, prosecutor, judge and executioner. It’s not on top of the list because of the temporary restraining order issued by the
Supreme Court enjoining the law’s implementation.

4. The Philippines’ ratification of the Domestic Workers Convention. Our ratification of the convention literally enabled the treaty to come into effect. This is the first convention that seeks to standardize the terms and conditions of employment of an estimated 50 million to 100 million domestic workers worldwide.

Under this convention, domestic workers are entitled to protection available to other workers, including weekly days off, limits to hours of work, and minimum wage and social security coverage. The convention also obliges governments to protect domestic workers from violence and abuse, and to prevent child labor in domestic work.

This will benefit at least 2 million domestic helpers locally, and millions more overseas. A domestic law that seeks to implement this convention was also passed by Congress this 2012.

5. The Philippines’ ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture. This will enable private individuals now to submit their individual communications to the Committee Against Torture whenever they feel that the country has failed to protect and promote the absolute prohibition on torture. We are the first Southeast Asian country to have ratified this optional protocol.

6. The periodic review of the Philippines in the Human Rights Council. Done once every four years, it is described by the UN High Commissioner as such: “The [Universal Periodic Review] is a state-driven process, under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, which provides the opportunity for each State to declare what actions they have taken to improve the human rights situations in their countries and to fulfill their human rights obligations. As one of the main features of the Council, the UPR is designed to ensure equal treatment for every country when their human rights situations are assessed.”

In its concluding observations, the Human Rights Council highlighted the need for the Philippines to take action against those who perpetrate violations to the right to life as evidenced by the high number of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

7. The periodic review of the Philippines in the UN Human Rights Committee. Also conducted every four years, this periodic review aims to “promote state compliance with the treaty principles and it should be an “honest appraisal of their conformity to the treaty obligations.” It is also a venue where state parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights report on “the measures [that the State has] adopted which give effect to the rights recognized” under the Covenant. In its concluding observations, the Committee asked the Philippine government to ensure
the binding and self-executory nature of the ICCPR and to inter-alia, also address the issues of libel as an infringement of freedom of expression, reparations of victims of trafficking, and also to end
impunity for those behind extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

8. Five media killings in 2012. This highlights that impunity, particularly against media practitioners, continues.

9. Four victims of enforced disappearances. This highlights the need to implement the new anti-enforced disappearance law.

10. Failure of the Aquino administration to adopt human rights agenda. This last item highlights that while it has supported crucial legislation to protect and promote human rights, the absence of a national human rights agenda is proof that human rights is not a priority.

Published in: on January 3, 2013 at 2:38 am  Comments (5)  
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Corona’s contemptible performance


Like millions of others, I was glued to the television the other day watching Chief Justice Renato Corona testify in his own impeachment trial.

Everything about last Tuesday was dramatic. First, there was his refusal to take the stand. He then relented and agreed to testify after the Ombudsman had detailed Anti-Money Laundering Council documents indicating that the chief justice had at least $12 million in various accounts. Prior to last Tuesday, his counsels and talking heads assured the public that Corona would “tell all” and would expose the malice of the individuals who falsely testified against him.

On the day itself, there was a meticulous script acted out by “B” actors, who now deserve acting awards. There was the traditional mass officiated by religious leaders closely identified with former President Gloria Arroyo, the usual illegal mass action by court officials and employees, and even a hero’s send-off for the embattled Corona.

At the Senate itself, the script was literally visible: a couple of pages of a monologue read out by Corona himself, a major deviation from ordinary court proceedings where witnesses are never allowed to deliver opening statements. This was a very carefully written script. Its writers knew that the opus would be allowed by a court that has repeatedly declared that it would respect the magistrate if and when he takes the stand. More importantly, its writers knew that the people would be watching.

And boy, what a show it turned out to be!

The scripted monologue itself was pathetic. Not only was it very poorly written, it was also bereft of the truth that Corona promised the nation. Half of it was mud thrown at the President, Ronald Llamas, and even Franklin Drilon. The other half was about the dirty laundry of the Basas.  Was Corona unmindful that his own children and wife were members of the same clan? The Senate President repeatedly asked him if he was finished, but he went on with his litany on matters, which were irrelevant and immaterial. And when he finally addressed the issue leveled against him by the Ombudsman, he resorted to a negative pregnant: the Ombudsman was lying but he admits having dollar deposits which according to him, are absolutely confidential and need not be declared in his SALN.

Prior to his appearance, a little known employee of the BIR, of all agencies, which the chief justice himself quoted in his monologue, opined that dollar deposits do not have to be disclosed in the SALN.

After which, he resorted to a conditional waiver of the secrecy of his dollar and pesos deposits, which takes effect only if and when the 188 congressmen who voted to impeach him and Franklin Drilon sign similar waivers. Talk of a cheap trick!

And after an excruciating two hours of vilification and self-pontification, he states that he is the chief justice of the Republic and leaves the stand.

I still can’t decide which was more offensive: his litany of mud or his walkout. I ask this because he is not just a very high official sought to be removed from his office. He is the chief justice if the land and as such, should personify the prestige and dignity of the legal profession. By resorting to mudslinging at the stand, Corona broke all rules of evidence that were developed over time to ascertain precisely the truth of controverted matters. And by walking out, he has shown contempt not only for the Senate sitting as an impeachment court, but to the rule of law itself, which as chief justice, he should be the first to uphold. If his departure were really for medical reasons, why did he not ask for leave of court? That would have been easy and would certainly have been granted on humanitarian grounds. It does not help that he was captured on camera clearly intent on leaving the Senate on cue. Clearly, what he and his advisers did not anticipate was that the Senate President would order the lock-out of the Senate to prevent him from leaving.

As I write this, it has become apparent that the chief justice will not return to the Senate as he is reportedly in the intensive care unit. I do not question his state of health as that is now between him and his creator. What I condemn is his performance that degraded the legal profession and eroded the people’s trust in the rule of law.

At the very least, Corona has proven to all that he does not deserve to remain as chief justice!

Published in: on May 24, 2012 at 12:19 am  Comments (28)  
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Philippines Get Poor Marks in Rule of Law Index


The Philippines received very poor to poor marks in the World Justice Project’s “Rule of Law Index”. The Index, according to the report, is “a new quantitative assessment tool designed to offer a comprehensive picture of the extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law in practice”.

According to the report, the Philippines scored very poorly and placed last or seventh out of seven Southeast Asian countries surveyed in the areas of law and security (.57), fundamental rights (.50), and effective criminal justice (.53). It was sixth, or second to the last in the region in the areas of Limited Government Power (.57), Absence of Corruption (.45), Clear, Publicized and Stable laws (.43), Regulatory Enforcement (.52) and Access to Civil Justice (.48). The Philippines ranked fifth in only one category: Open Government (.38).

In its Executive Summary, the World Justice Project defined the rule of law as rules-based system where four universal principles are upheld: The government and its officials and agents are accountable under the laws; The laws are clear, publicized, stable and fair, and protect fundamental rights, including security of persons and property; The process by which laws are enacted, administered and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient; and Access to Justice is provided by competent, independent and ethical adjudicators, attorneys or representatives and judicial officers who are of sufficient numbers, have adequate resources, and reflect the make-up of the community they serve.

In its “Regional Highlight”, the report observed that in East Asia and Pacific “Wealthier countries such as Japan , Australia , Singapore and South Korea score high in most dimensions. In contrast, Indonesia , the Philippines and Thailand generally rank significantly lower than the wealthier countries in the region”. Relative to the world, the report concluded: “The Philippines falls within the bottom half of the rankings, even when compared to similarly situated countries, particularly in the areas of stable laws, access to justice and corruption.

The report also reported that as experienced by the people, 87% of 1000 respondents from Manila, Cebu and Davao said that they have not experienced a burglary within the last three years. Out of the 13% that responded that they have in fact experienced burglary, 51% reported the crime to the police, while 49% did not. On mechanisms to enforce a contract or to recover a debt, only 5% of the respondents went to court and expected the process to last 1 to 3 years, while 27% of the respondents resorted to direct renegotiation and 23% took not action. These figures can be read as indicative of a lack of trust in the Philippians judicial system by the individuals who took part in the survey.

The study defined government powers as “the means by which the powers of the government are limited and by which they are held accountable under the law”. In its study on corruption, the report considered three forms of corruption: bribery, improper influence by public or private interests, and misappropriation of entrusted public resources.

In measuring the rule of law, the report first developed the conceptual framework summarized in the Index’s ten factors in consultation with academics, practitioners and community leaders around the world. A questionnaire was then developed based on the conceptual framework and administered by experts and reputable polling entities. A team then collected and mapped the data into 49 sub-factors. A final ranking was made using a five step process. The data was then subjected to several tests to identify possible biases and errors. The findings were then subjected to a sensitivity analysis by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre.

The report indicated the following individuals as Honorary Chairs of the project: Madelaine Albright, James Baker III, Stephen Breyer, Jimmy Carter, Warren Christopher, Hilario Davide Jr, William Gates Sr, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’ Connor, Desmund Tutu, Paul A. Volker, among others.

Published in: on February 8, 2011 at 1:57 am  Comments (7)  
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Wanted: A Regional Human Rights Body


On October 23rd, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) officially inaugurated the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Amongst its purposes is to “to promote human rights within the regional context, bearing in mind national and regional particularities and mutual respect for different historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, and taking into account the balance between rights and responsibilities”. Amongst its mandates, on the other hand, is “to develop an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration with a view to establishing a framework for human rights cooperation through various ASEAN conventions and other instruments dealing with human rights”.

The creation of the AICHR was expectedly met with high hopes that ASEAN, amongst the most vibrant regional groupings today, would finally establish a regional human rights mechanism. While there was no illusion that this body would replicate the European Court of Human Rights overnight, it was at least expected that the body would prove to be somehow responsive to the human rights challenges in the region and at least have the competence to declare countries in breach of their human right obligations. ASEAN, after all, is home not just to some of the fastest growing economies in the world; but also to the most repressive regimes with Burma high up on the list, and Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore not far behind.

Because of high expectations for this newly created Commission, some relatives of victims of the infamous Ampatuan massacre in Maguindanao, filed the very first communication with the commission barely two months after the massacre. The massacre was widely reported worldwide because of its gruesome nature: the perpetrators killed all 58 victims in cold blood using high-powered firearms and attempted to bury all evidence of the massacre, both corpses and vehicles, in three holes dug by a back hoe in Sitio Masalai, Ampatuan Maguindanao. At least 32 of the victims were journalists, adding notoriety to the massacre as the single most deadly attack against journalists worldwide. The communication filed by 13 family members of slain journalists sought to declare the Philippines in breach of the right to life and freedom of the press when their loved ones, all journalists, were killed by at least 195 individuals, all of whom are state organs. By way of reliefs prayed for, the petitioners, led by a high school teacher, Noemi Parcon, asked for a declaration of breach a well as for the Philippine government to make reparations and to pay compensation.

The petition was filed with a sense of desperation. With the suspected perpetrators perceived to be very close allies of the Former Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the victims were fearful of a whitewash and a cover-up. This fear proved to be well founded since 10 months after the filing of the communication, Lakmudin Saliao, testified in court how the accused spent 400 Million pesos to cover-up the massacre. Human Rights Report would also conclude that the former President was at least partially responsible for the massacre because of her complicity.

As an advocacy tool, the petition was envisioned to trigger the development of a mechanism that would at least receive individual communications and declare breach of state obligations under human right law, at least in the manner by which the UN treaty monitoring bodies do. While these bodies issue only non-binding “views”, it was hoped that since no state would want to be declared to be in breach of a state obligation, that the declaration of breach by itself would be a remedy of sorts for those whose rights have been violated. Eventually, it was also hoped that the body would develop in the path of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which today, declares breaches of state obligations and orders both reparations and the payment of compensation.

The high hopes for the commission proved short- lived. In March 26, 20101, Rafendi Djamin, the Indonesian Representative to the Commission and respected as its most “progressive” commissioner, faced Noemi Parcon and others who sought to file their own communications and delivered the the sad news: the Commission will only receive thematic reports on human rights issues, but not individual complaints, and therefore no further action will be taken on any petition.

A year after the Ampatuan massacre, the victims continue to be denied of a speedy remedy under domestic law since a judgment of conviction does not appear to be possible in the near future. They are furthermore, denied reparations and compensation. It is precisely because of these shortcomings of our domestic law that a regional human rights mechanism should be established and soon.

Published in: on December 1, 2010 at 11:55 pm  Leave a Comment  
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Living with Terrorism


Living with terrorism
I can only be sympathetic to President Aquino’s complaint that the travel advisories issued by at least nine foreign governments against travel to the Philippines, including Metro-Manila, lack factual basis.

To begin with, existing United Nations General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions obligate states to cooperate with each other in the fight against terrorism. This means sharing information about possible terrorist attacks. Contrary hence to the remark of Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, the diplomatic missions of states that issued the advisories have the positive obligation to share with our authorities their intelligence information relating to possible terrorist attacks against the Philippines. Obviously, such cooperation is made even more necessary because of the sad reality that despite billions that we have appropriated for intelligence gathering, we are still the last to know about possible terrorist threats. Oftentimes, there is complete failure of intelligence. How many times have we woken up to news about terrorist attacks without being warned of an impending attack? This was what happened when the LRT was bombed on Rizal day several years back. This is also what happened to a series of kidnappings involving children and foreigners by the terrorist group, the Abu Sayaff.

But it is not just in intelligence, or the lack thereof, that we suffer a disability. It is also the case that we have created our own problems with terrorism. The Abu Sayaff is a concrete example. Veteran journalist Marites Vitug wrote in her book “Under the Crescent Moon” that this notorious terrorist group was in fact a creation of our very own Armed Forces of the Philippines.

According to Vitug, the group, whose name is literally translated as the “shining path”, was formed by the military to train Filipino Muslims fight the Russians when the latter occupied Afghanistan. They apparently were intended to be an elite group of “jihads” who simply had nothing else to do after their brief engagement in Central Asia. Maria Ressa, on the other hand, also asserted in her book , “Seeds of Terror” that the Arroyo administration knew that the Jemiah Islamiah (JI) and other notorious terrorist groups were training in Mindanao. Yet nothing was done to stop them. In legal parlance, this inaction is tantamount to acquiescence, if not complicity to terrorism. If what was written by these respected journalists is true, this may explain why foreign governments have not bothered sharing their intelligence with our own authorities: a belief that we are perhaps both complacent and complicit to terrorism.

Add to this what Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extralegal Killings, said was the root cause of impunity in the Philippines: the lack of political will to punish the perpetrators of international crimes in the country. What we thus have is a country that created its own terrorists, allowed its territory to be used to train these terrorists, and a legal system that would not work against terrorists.

To be fair, these unkind words about the lack of resolve to deal with impunity including terrorism refer to a sin of the Arroyo administration. Perhaps P-Noy’s administration would finally develop the will to deal with both impunity and terrorism. It helps that the President has at least reposed his trust on his Executive Secretary, Paquito “Jojo” Ochoa, to head the Anti-terrorism Council. This means that his most trusted alter ego will lead the fight against terrorism. Perhaps this will help build the resolve and facilitate preemptive responses against imminent terrorist threats.

To be fair again, and this will probably be my kindest words for the past dispensation, P-Noy’s fight against terrorism will be facilitated by recent congressional enactments, the Human Security Act and RA 9851, the 2009 International Humanitarian Law Act. While I have been critical of the HSA, as in fact, I am counsel to the only remaining challenge to the constitutionality of the law—a petition filed by my class in Constitutional Law 2 three years ago that is still pending in the Quezon City Regional Trial Court—the fact that authorities now have extraordinary powers to intercept and record communications, freeze bank deposits, classify organizations as being terrorist, and even the power to resort to indefinite pre-trial detention are the stuff that rightists and fascists wanted, nay demanded, as effective tools against terrorism. Why these powers have not been resorted to by law enforcement in dealing with real terrorists is a mystery. What has been clear though is that they have opted to use these extraordinary powers instead as tools in its on-going anti- insurgency campaign. The one and only person charged for “terrorism” is an aeta accused of being a fighter for the New Peoples Army.

The 2009 IHL Act on the other hand is an effective and ideal tool against “terrorist attacks that seek to spread terror and fear in the civilian population” in times of armed conflicts and when committed in a widespread or systematic manner. I consider the enactment of RA 9851 as the most effective tool against modern day terrorism since it can be used to prosecute all attacks against civilian populations. We can only hope that under P-Noy, the law will be implemented to the letter to ensure maximum protection to the lives and property of innocent civilians.

Meanwhile, we Filipinos can learn a lesson or two from countries that have had more experience in dealing with terrorist attacks, such as the United Kingdom. In the year that I lived as a student in London, I noticed the tools that the Brits used in fighting terrorism: omnipresent surveillance cameras, effective law enforcement agents who are both competent and visible, an efficient prosecution service that is able to convict, and a judiciary that is beyond reproach. Above all, there is a community that is both vigilant against terrorism and with the resolve to deny terrorists what they truly want: to be in a state of terror and panic by leaving their lives in the most normal manner that they can. In the shadow of terrorism, let’s live and let live!

***

Erratum: In my last column, I omitted legal luminary Pete Maniego, P-Noy’s Chairman of the National Renewable Energy Board, from the list of students responsible for the comfort women’s Petition, Vinuya v. Exceuitve Secretary. So sorry, Pete!

Published in: on November 10, 2010 at 10:28 pm  Leave a Comment  
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MORE PLAGIARISM IN THE DEL CASTILLO’s PONENCIA IN “ANG LADLAD”


One of my former students who is now pursuing further studies in the US made an independent review of the ponencia of SC Justice Mariano del Castillo in the “Ang Ladlad” case and listed the following instances of plagiarism:

Ladlad ponencia by J. del Castillo Original source 
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court’s supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost attention to the principles characterising a “democratic society”. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2), it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”. This means, amongst other things, that every “formality”, “condition”, “restriction” or “penalty” imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  

Source: Section 49 of Handyside vs. United Kingdom (1979), a decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)

 
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government. 

Source: Hurley vs. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston Inc., 515 U.S. 557, at 579.

 
However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community. Religion is an integral aspect of people’s lives, and cannot be left at the boardroom door. What secularism does rule out, however, is any attempt to use the religious views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community. 

Source: Section 19 of Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, 2002 SCC 86, a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada

 
[42] x x x  See also, L. and V. v Austria (2003-I 29; (2003) 36 EHRR 55) and S.L. v Austria (2003-I 71; (2003) 37 EHRR 39),  where the European Court considered that Austria’s differing age of consent for heterosexual and homosexual relations was discriminatory; it ‘embodied a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority’, which could not ‘amount to sufficient justification for the differential treatment any more than similar negative attitudes towards those of a different race, origin or colour’. 

 

 In L. and V. v Austria65 and S.L. v Austria66 the ECtHR considered that Austria’s differing age of consent for heterosexual and homosexual relations was discriminatory; it ‘embodied a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority’, which could not ‘amount to sufficient justification for the differential treatment any more than similar negative attitudes towards those of a different race, origin or colour’.67 

65 L. andV. vAustria 2003-I 29; (2003) 36 EHRR 55.

66 S.L. vAustria 2003-I 71; (2003) 37 EHRR 39.

67 L. andV. vAustria, supra n. 65; and S.L. vAustria, ibid. at para. 44.

Source: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International

Human Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, Human Rights Law Review (2008) 8(2), 207-248, at 217.

Note:

(1)    The Human Rights Law Review is published by the Oxford University Press.

(2)    The journal article by O’Flaherty and Fisher was never cited in the Ladlad ponencia.

 
[44] x x x Note that in Baczkowski and Others v. Poland, Application No. 1543/06; Judgment of May 3, 2007, the ECHR unanimously ruled that the banning of an LGBT gay parade in Warsaw was a discriminatory violation of Article 14 of the ECHR, which provides: 

The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.

It also found that banning LGBT parades violated the group’s freedom of assembly and association. Referring to the hallmarks of a “democratic society”, the Court has attached particular importance to pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. In that context, it has held that although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of the majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.

 

 63. Referring to the hallmarks of a “democratic society”, the Court has attached particular importance to pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. In that context, it has held that although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of the majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position (see Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 25, § 63, and Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/95 and 28443/95, ECHR 1999-III, p. 65, § 112). 

Source: Paragraph 63 of Baczkowski and Others v. Poland, Application No. 1543/06; Judgment of May 3, 2007, a decision by the European Court of Human Rights.
[46] x x x x 

So, too, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (530 U.S. 640 [2000]), the US Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts of America could not be compelled to accept a homosexual as a scoutmaster, because “the Boy Scouts believe that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill in its youth members; it will not “promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”

When an expressive organization is compelled to associate with a person whose views the group does not accept, the organization’s message is undermined; the organization is understood to embrace, or at the very least tolerate, the views of the persons linked with them. The scoutmaster’s presence “would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”

 When an expressive organization is compelled to associate with a person whose views the group does not accept, the organization’s message is undermined; the organization is understood to embrace, or at the very least tolerate, the views of the persons linked with them. We therefore held, for example, that a State severely burdened the right of expressive association when it required the Boy Scouts to accept an openly gay scoutmaster. The scoutmaster’s presence “would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.” Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 653 (2000). 

Source: Justice Antonin Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, et al., 552 US 442, at 463.
[49] The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has dealt with the matter in its General Comments, the interpretative texts it issues to explicate the full meaning of the provisions of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In General Comments Nos. 18 of 2005 (on the right to work) (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The right to work, E/C.12/GC/18, November 24, 2005), 15 of 2002 (on the right to water) (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, E/C.12/2002/11, November 26, 2002) and 14 of 2000 (on the right to the highest attainable standard of health) (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health, E/C.12/2000/4, August 14, 2000), it has indicated that the Covenant proscribes any discrimination on the basis of, inter-alia, sex and sexual orientation. 

The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has also dealt with the issue in a General Comment. In its General Comment No. 4 of 2003, it stated that, “State parties have the obligation to ensure that all human beings below 18 enjoy all the rights set forth in the Convention [on the Rights of the Child] without discrimination (Article 2), including with regard to ‘‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status’’. These grounds also cover [inter alia] sexual orientation”. (Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4: Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, July 1, 2003, CRC/GC/2003/4).

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), has, on a number of occasions, criticized States for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. For example, it also addressed the situation in Kyrgyzstan and recommended that, “lesbianism be reconceptualized as a sexual orientation and that penalties for its practice be abolished” (Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women regarding Kyrgyzstan, February 5, 1999, A/54/38 at par. 128).

 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has dealt with the matter in its General Comments, the interpretative texts it issues to explicate the full meaning of the provisions of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In General Comments Nos 18 of 2005 (on the right to work),37 15 of 2002 (on the right to water)38 and 14 of 2000 (on the right to the highest attainable standard of health),39 it has indicated that the Covenant proscribes any discrimination on the basis of, inter-alia, sex and sexual orientation ‘that has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise of [the right at issue]’. The CESCR has consistently based this prohibition on the terms of the Covenant’s anti-discrimination provision, Article 2.2, which lists invidious categories of discrimination as 

including ‘sex’ and ‘other status’. Presumably, since the CESCR distinguishes ‘sex’and ‘sexual orientation’ in its General Comments, it locates sexual orientation within the rubric of ‘other status’. The CESCR, in the General Comments, also invokes the article addressing equal rights of men and women, Article 3, as a basis for its prohibition of sexual orientation-related discrimination. This linkage of the categories of sex and sexual orientation-related discrimination is discussed subsequently in the context of the practice of the Human Rights Committee (HRC).

The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has also dealt with the issue in a General Comment. In its General Comment No. 4 of 2003,40 it stated that, ‘State parties have the obligation to ensure that all human beings below 18 enjoy all the rights set forth in the Convention [on the Rights of the Child] without discrimination (Article 2), including with regard to ‘‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status’’. These grounds also cover [inter alia] sexual orientation’. The CRC thus appears to adopt the same approach as the CESCR in locating sexual orientation within the category of ‘other status’.

x x x x

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), notwithstanding that it has not addressed the matter in a General Comment or otherwise specified the applicable provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, on a number of occasions has criticised States for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. For example, it also addressed the situation in Kyrgyzstan and recommended that,‘lesbianism be reconceptualised as a sexual orientation and that penalties for its practice be abolished’.44 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) appears never to have engaged with issues of discrimination against persons who belong to both racial and sexual minority groups. This gap is startling when one considers the authoritative evidence of such persons facing forms of ‘double discrimination’, as reported, for instance, by the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.45

37 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The right to work, E/C.12/GC/18, 24 November 2005.

38 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, E/C.12/2002/11, 26 November 2002.

39 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health, E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000.

40 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4: Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1 July 2003, CRC/GC/

2003/4.

x x x x

44 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women regarding Kyrgyzstan, 5 February 1999, A/54/38 at para. 128.

45 Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Commission on Human Rights, 28 February 2006,

E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3 at para. 40.

Source: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International

Human Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, Human Rights Law Review (2008) 8(2), 207-248, at 214-216.

Note:

(1)    The Human Rights Law Review is published by the Oxford University Press.

(2)    The journal article by O’Flaherty and Fisher was never cited in the Ladlad ponencia.

 
[51] The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity is a set of international principles relating to sexual orientation and gender identity, intended to address documented evidence of abuse of rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals. It contains 29 Principles adopted by human rights practitioners and experts, together with recommendations to governments, regional intergovernmental institutions, civil society, and the United Nations. The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity is a set of international principles relating to sexual orientation and gender identity, intended to address documented evidence of abuse of rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, and further of intersexuality requested by Louise Arbour according to the International Human Rights Law. 

Source: Wikipedia –
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yogyakarta_Principles

It contains 29 Principles adopted unanimously by the experts, along with recommendations to governments, regional intergovernmental institutions, civil society, and the UN itself.

Source: Human Rights Watch World Report 2008, p. 36. Preview of the book (as well as the relevant page) is available at:


http://books.google.com/books?id=4QL9BElMSbkC

 
Published in: on October 26, 2010 at 9:37 am  Comments (18)  
Tags: , , , , , ,

SC in a tight spot – INQUIRER.net, Philippine News for Filipinos


SC in a tight spot – INQUIRER.net, Philippine News for Filipinos.

 

Dean Abad is correct: Why do we accept that Justices allow their young researchers  write their decisions?

Published in: on October 26, 2010 at 12:21 am  Comments (2)  
Tags: , , ,

US constitutionalist: SC risking reputation in punishing UP law professors – INQUIRER.net, Philippine News for Filipinos


US constitutionalist: SC risking reputation in punishing UP law professors – INQUIRER.net, Philippine News for Filipinos.

Published in: on October 25, 2010 at 2:56 am  Comments (2)  
Tags: , , , ,

An Open Appeal to International Legal Scholars by Professor Diane A. Desierto, University of the Philippines College of Law


Dear friends and fellow legal scholars,

I apologize for this long note, but I thought I should set the record straight on the maelstrom of ongoing institutional persecution against the UP Law Faculty, where I serve as a faculty member. Several hours ago, a majority at the Philippine Supreme Court issued an unprecedented contempt order for the “Statement of the Faculty of the UP College of Law”, naming 37 out of 81 faculty members (including five present and former deans, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court now back in the faculty, among other senior academics and junior faculty members) whose physical signatures appeared in the Statement. Many faculty members support this Statement, but, as is customary, did not need to physically sign the Statement so long as we signified our support over email. For this reason, many of us understand the contempt order to eventually extend to all 81 members of the UP College of Law. All our bar licenses, without which we cannot teach, work, or practice as lawyers, are now at stake.

Let me narrate the brief factual background of this case:

1. On April 28, 2010, the Philippine Supreme Court issued its decision in Isabelita Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (full text of this decision available at:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm ). This case involved a certiorari petition of most remaining Filipina survivors of the “comfort women system” during World War II, asking the Court to compel the Executive Branch to exercise its constitutional duties and international obligations, in order to ensure these Filipina survivors’ their rights to redress. I wrote this petition as a law student of UP Law in 2004 along with UP Law Professor Harry Roque, theorizing then that our broadly universalist 1987 Philippine Constitution imposed unique constitutional duties on the Philippine President to observe our international legal obligations, including the right to redress for war crimes, mass rapes, and sexual slavery. Professor Roque and I published our analysis and theory of the petition in 2006, in the Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict. (full text of this available at: http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/ifhv/documents/huvi/huv_2006/3_2006.pdf Relevant pages are pp. 91-98).

2. The Vinuya decision denied the petition. Professor Roque filed an initial Motion for Reconsideration, subject to the submission of a more extended Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration (Supplemental MR) under the Philippine Rules of Court. Professor Roque and his colleague, Attorney Romel Bagares, closely coordinated with me in the preparation of the Supplemental MR . After we discussed the legal arguments, I requested Attorney Bagares to recheck all sources cited in the Vinuya decision, as is customary for us in preparing appellate pleadings. Several days later, Attorney Bagares and Professor Roque discovered that many significant portions of the Vinuya decision appeared to have been lifted without attribution from the works of International Law authors (Professor Evan Criddle and Professor Evan Fox-descent’s 2009 Article in the Yale Journal of International Law, titled “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens”; the book of Dr. Christian Tams, titled Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law, published by Cambridge University Press; and an article by Mark Ellis, Executive Director of the International Bar Association, in the 2006 volume of Case Western Journal of International Law, entitled “Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime”). What was worse than the lifting without attribution of these sources was that the Vinuya Decision completely twisted what the authors said in their works. Professor Roque and Attorney Bagares decided to file the Supplemental MR inviting the Philippine Supreme Court’s attention to this grave matter, showing that the misrepresentation of these works erroneously laid the foundation for the Court’s decision to deny the petition. The Supplemental MR also included the rest of the arguments of the petition. The full text of the Supplemental MR can be found here:http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/

3. All International Law professors/authors came forward with their separate complaints to the Philippine Supreme Court regarding the misuse of their works. Unfortunately, FB doesn’t have an attachment function yet, so I will repost in a separate note the letters of Dr. Christian Tams, Mark Ellis to the Philippine Supreme Court. Professor Evan Criddle posted his complaint on Opinio Juris at this link:http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/19/international-law-plagiarism-charge-bedevils-philippines-supreme-court-justice/

a) Professor Criddle told Opinio Juris: “Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite.”

b) Dr. Tams’ letter said: “The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of referencing. I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgment’s cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm place in contemporary international law….With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable Court’s judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging it.”

c) Mr. Ellis’ letter said: “My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine Chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI), an affiliate of the London based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI) where I sit as a trustee. In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.”

4. When Philippine national media carried these complaints, the Philippine Supreme Court did not appear disposed to take them seriously. The Court Spokesperson/Court Administrator, Midas Marquez, stated that the “You can’t expect all justices of the Supreme Court to be familiar with these law journals.”http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100721-282283/High-court-not-probing-plagiarism

5. In light of the apparent plagiarism and twisting of the works in the text of the Vinuya Decision and the Court’s predispositions, the UP Law Faculty issued a Statement asking the Court to take responsibility and to provide guidance to the Philippine bench and bar. The UP Law Faculty, headed by the present Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and other law deans, expressed alarm at how the works were misused to deny a key petition of comfort women survivors, and asked the ponente of the Vinuya Decision, Justice Mariano del Castillo to voluntarily resign from the Court. The full text of the UP Law Faculty Statement can be found here:http://harryroque.com/2010/08/09/restoring-integritya-statement-by-the-faculty-of/

6. On Friday, October 15, 2010, a majority of ten members of the Philippine Supreme Court issued a resolution denying that Justice del Castillo had committed plagiarism and misuse of plagiarized works, holding that Justice del Castillo’s clerk/court researcher accidentally deleted the attributions, which could not have been detected since “the Microsoft word program does not have a function that raises an alarm when original materials are cut up or pruned.” The full text of the decision can be found here:http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/october2010/10-7-17-SC.htm

7. The newest member of the Court, Justice Lourdes Aranal-Sereno, strongly dissented along with (Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales) from the Court’s findings and showed why plagiarism and misrepresentation was committed not just through deletions of attributions, but due to the deliberate inclusion of phrases that tried to convey the opposite of what the authors’ works said. Saying that the court will be remembered for saying Del Castillo did not commit plagiarism because there was “no malicious intent” to pass off someone else’s works as his own, Justice Sereno added that the ruling of the court’s majority has caused “unimaginable problems” for the Philippine academe. She explained decisions on future cases of plagiarism committed by students will be based on the court’s ruling that malicious intent must be present to constitute plagiarism. “Unless reconsidered, this Court would unfortunately be remembered as the Court that made ‘malicious intent’ an indispensable element of plagiarism and that made computer-keying errors an exculpatory fact in charges of plagiarism, without clarifying whether its ruling applies only to situations of judicial decision-making or to other written intellectual activity,” said Sereno. “It will also weaken this Court’s disciplinary authority ─ the essence of which proceeds from its moral authority ─ over the bench and bar. In a real sense, this Court has rendered tenuous its ability to positively educate and influence the future of intellectual and academic discourse,” she added. The full text of the Sereno dissent can be found here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/october2010/10-7-17-SC_sereno.htm

8. On Monday, October 18, 2010, various Philippine national media carried the news that the Philippine Supreme Court had deliberated and decided to hold the UP Law Faculty in contempt for its Statement. Seehttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20101020-298693/UP-Law-faces-sanction-over-SC-plagiarism-case andhttp://www.gmanews.tv/story/203873/up-law-risks-sanctions-for-statements-on-plagiarism-mess , among others.

9. Copies of the Court’s seven-page Order were finally seen several hours ago. As will be seen from the full text of the Order and the dissenting opinions (I will repost this file in a separate note), the Court majority made the unprecedented move of holding the UP Law Faculty in contempt, until they can show why they do not merit contempt. Three justices of the Court noted this prejudgment in their dissents:

CARPIO-MORALES, j., dissenting:

“The Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive flexing of the judicial muscle that could hardly be characterized as judicious. This knee-jerk response from the Court stares back at its own face, since this judicial act is one that is “totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance.

xxx

The adverse declarations describing the written work of the UP law faculty operate to their prejudice since that would render any subsequent proceeding illusory, because the Court, which would ultimately decide the administrative case, has already made up its mind before hearing the parties.

Worse, the Resolution is not what it purports to be. Ostensibly, the Resolution is a show cause order that initiates what would merely become a newly docketed regular administrative matter. There is more than meets the eye, however. When stripped of its apparent complexion, the Resolution shows its true colors and presents itself as a pronouncement of guilt of indirect contempt, without proper recourse left to the parties.

xxx

Unless the Court intends to busy itself into consistently engaging in a judicial witch hunt against its detractors, it is more in keeping with the Court’s dignity not to dignify each and every write-up that is taken to vilify it, and console itself with the number of testimonials, written or living that vilify the judiciary.

Although as a human being, a person naturally gets pissed off by hurtful words, it would not hurt the Court as an institution and the law as a profession if it passes off the statement of the UP law faculty at this time.”

SERENO, j., dissenting.

“Ordering the 37 respondent members of the UP law faculty to “show cause” in this indirect contempt case is like ordering the little boy who exclaimed that “the emperor has no clothes” to explain why he should be crucified for his public observation. It is true that the little boy may have aggravated the situation by adding that the unclothed emperor did not present a flattering figure in his natural state, but the analogy remains true — that the subject UP law faculty members have been prematurely adjudged guilty and asked to explain why such prejudgment should be reversed simply for expressing what they believed was the truth.

xxx

What is so grievous about this whole contempt proceeding is that it comes in the wake of the gross injury that the Court has inflicted upon the virtue of honesty in learned discourses by labeling plagiarism as not plagiarism in the related case involving one of its members.

With all due respect to my colleagues, it is not the place of the Court to seek revenge against those who, in their wish to see reform in the judiciary, have the courage to say what is wrong with it. The Court finds its legitimacy in demonstrating its moral vein case after case, not in flaunting its judicial brawn. There is nothing to be gained for the administration of justice in not letting his one instance pass just because feelings have been hurt and the urge to retaliate must be satisfied.

If the 37 members of the UP law faculty are wrong, there will be recompense in their loss of esteem among the academic community and the legal profession. But if they are right, then the Court will have made martyrs out of those who — in their temporary passion — may have acted recklessly, but truthfully and sincerely. Indeed, should they be proven right they may even rise in the esteem in the eyes of the international academic and legal circles, for being the object of prosecution by one’s Supreme Court for bold but intelligent reformist language can be deemed a badge of honor similar to that bequeathed by history to the great thinkers who were persecuted by society’s forces.”

In view of the blatant institutional persecution now being committed against the UP Law Faculty — who discharged their duties in good faith as public servants, law professors, and officers of the Court in asking the Court to take responsibility for the apparent plagiarism and misrepresentation that tainted the Vinuya decision — I urgently plead for the help of fellow legal scholars and academics to write — either public statements, or letters to their embassies in Manila regarding this matter. As the dissenting Justices have disclosed, the Supreme Court majority has already prejudged this matter, and that same majority will prevail in imposing sanctions (from disbarment, to suspension of bar licenses, fines, imprisonment) on the UP Law Faculty. We cannot realistically expect a fair hearing anymore when the majority acts as both the supposed “injured” party and our judge at the same time. We acted in good faith, conscious of our duties as lawyers and legal scholars, to ensure the preservation of integrity in our jurisprudence —- we could not anticipate then, nor would we have accepted now as law professors and members of the Philippine legal academia, the Supreme Court majority’s defense that Microsoft Word was responsible for failing to detect the plagiarism and misrepresentation. The objective fact of plagiarism and misrepresentation are glaring from the text of Vinuya, as confirmed by the international law professors whose works were used, and as confirmed by the extensive dissent of Justice Sereno. Most importantly, we acted from our sense of justice and duty as lawyers to promote the rule of law, on behalf of those comfort women survivors whose petition was denied through a decision-making process that apparently relied on plagiarized and misrepresented works of international law authors.

Our only hope now is for reason from the rest of the world to prevail against this institutional persecution — the glaring and ongoing threats to our constitutional and international rights to freedom of expression and academic freedom. While it appears that only 37 of the 81 faculty members signed the UP Law Faculty Statement, the Court majority overlooked all the names sent in the original list by Dean Marvic Leonen. It has been our practice to signify support for statements electronically through email or discussions in our faculty egroup, and for many of us abroad it was not necessary to physically sign so long as we expressed our support for the statement to the faculty egroup. We expect, therefore, that it will only be a matter of time before the contempt order is extended to all of us. We will not shirk from our part in having supported the UP Law Faculty Statement.

We fervently hope for your help in this fight against institutional persecution. We have no recourse left.

Very truly yours,

Professor Diane A. Desierto, University of the Philippines College of Law

Law Reform Specialist, Institute of International Legal Studies, University of the Philippines

JSD candidate (2014), LLM (2009), Yale Law School

* IMPORTANT: This NOTE in NO WAY represents the views of the International Court of Justice or any of its staff. This Note was written in my private capacity, SOLELY as a member of the UP Law Faculty.

Published in: on October 21, 2010 at 10:55 pm  Comments (6)  
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